Popper and falsifiability
This page delivers no verdict; it presents claims and evidence with their sources. No theory in science is absolute. Method
For everyone
For Popper a scientific theory can never be conclusively verified, only falsified. What makes a theory scientific is that it says in advance which observation would refute it. He cited Einstein's relativity as fitting this criterion, and Freud's psychoanalysis and Marx's theory of history as not fitting it.
For specialists
Logik der Forschung (1934; English 1959) rejects inductivism and proposes a method of "conjectures and refutations" by trial and error. Critics showed that in the actual history of science theories are not abandoned at once in the face of anomalous observations (Kuhn, Lakatos). Because of the Duhem–Quine problem a single observation may not suffice to falsify a theory logically.
Claims
- A theory is scientific to the extent that it specifies observations that could falsify it.[1]
Positions
- Imre Lakatos
- Science advances through "research programmes", not single theories; a programme's hard core is protected from anomalies by auxiliary hypotheses.[2]
Connections
Sources
- Book (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London (Logik der Forschung, 1934)
- Book (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. Lakatos, I.; Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 91–196
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Cite this page
Athena contributors. (2026). Popper and falsifiability. Athena: The tree of human knowledge. Retrieved November 1, 2026, from https://latifkedi.github.io/athena/en/d/popper/
@misc{athena_popper,
title = {Popper and falsifiability},
author = {{Athena contributors}},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {\url{https://latifkedi.github.io/athena/en/d/popper/}},
note = {Athena: The tree of human knowledge. Accessed: 2026-11-01}
}Added: September 27, 2026 · Last changed: September 27, 2026 · Page history