Descartes and methodical doubt
This page delivers no verdict; it presents claims and evidence with their sources. No theory in science is absolute. Method
For everyone
To reach certain knowledge Descartes proposed doubting everything that can be doubted, and concluded that as a thinking being who doubts he cannot doubt his own existence: "I think, therefore I am." He argued that mind and body are two distinct substances, placing the "mind–body problem" at the centre of modern philosophy.
For specialists
The Discourse on the Method (1637) and the Meditations (1641) contain radical doubt via the evil-demon hypothesis, the cogito and arguments for God's existence. The "Cartesian circle" objection holds that Descartes grounds the reliability of clear and distinct perceptions on God and God's existence on clear and distinct perceptions. Interactionist dualism was criticised with the question of how an immaterial mind can affect the body, an objection due to Elisabeth of Bohemia.
Claims
Evidence
Connections
Sources
- Book (1637). Discours de la méthode. Ian Maire, Leiden
- Book (1641). Meditationes de prima philosophia. Michel Soly, Paris
- EncyclopediaRené Descartes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyplato.stanford.eduarchive
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Cite this page
Athena contributors. (2026). Descartes and methodical doubt. Athena: The tree of human knowledge. Retrieved November 1, 2026, from https://latifkedi.github.io/athena/en/d/descartes/
@misc{athena_descartes,
title = {Descartes and methodical doubt},
author = {{Athena contributors}},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {\url{https://latifkedi.github.io/athena/en/d/descartes/}},
note = {Athena: The tree of human knowledge. Accessed: 2026-11-01}
}Added: September 27, 2026 · Last changed: September 27, 2026 · Page history